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On Thursday, February 28, 1985, a 9 mm bullet pierced the
window of Justice Harry Blackmun's high-rise apartment.
Whether by chance or design, the bullet that missed a mark took
on symbolic importance-Roe v. Wade' was still very much un-
der attack. That attack continues to manifest itself in a variety
of ways, from proposed constitutional amendments to clinic
bombings to assassinations of doctors. Those, of course, are
among the most extreme and blatant attacks by anti-Roe zealots.
Roe has also been besieged by other attacks, more subtle
but nonetheless significant, which were facilitated by three Su-
preme Court Justices who proclaimed that they were defending
it and, we assume, acted in good faith. We refer, of course, to
the plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,. jointly
authored by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.
What if Casey had been decided differently? What if Jus-
tice O'Connor and/or Justice Kennedy had joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, White, and Thomas to overrule
* Professor of Law at New York Law School and President of the American Civil
Liberties Union. (It should be noted that the ACLU represented Planned Parenthood in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, urging the Supreme Court to
reaffirm Roe v. Wade in its entirety.) The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance
of Professor Strossen's Chief Aide, Amy L. Tenney, and her Research Assistant, Casar
DeCastro. An online version of this commentary may be found on the Jurist website
(online articles) at <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu>.
** Ronald Collins heads a First Amendment project sponsored by a public interest
group in Washington, D.C.; he is also the co-editor of Books-on-Law
(http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/lawbooks). The title is borrowed from Sigmund Freud, sans any
Freudian implications.., as far as we are aware.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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Roe v. Wade outright,3 as O'Connor and Kennedy had previously
suggested they might be inclined to do?4
Rather than leaping headlong into the politics of 1992-1993
and the fate of the Freedom of Choice Act, then pending in
Congress, we prefer to begin with some observations about Ca-
sey and how it has affected public perceptions of reproductive
freedom in America.
"[T]he essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained
and once again reaffirmed," declared the Casey plurality opin-
ion. That opinion reiterated the "unbroken commitment by this
Court to the essential holding of Roe."6 As if two such profes-
sions of constitutional fidelity were not enough, the joint opinion
further proclaimed: "[O]ur... analysis does not disturb the cen-
tral holding of Roe v. Wade, and we reaffirm that holding."7
With Orwellian facility, Roe's essence had been redefined.
Never mind that what was once a "fundamental right,"8 trigger-
ing strict judicial scrutiny of any restrictions, was relegated to
constitutional limbo as a "liberty claim [ ],"9 warranting judicial
review of any restrictions only under the deferential, malleable
"undue burden" rubric." Never mind, also, that government of-
ficials were licensed to circumscribe women's "liberty claims""
3. The Casey dissenters may well have had a fifth vote if that 1985 bullet had hit
and killed Justice Blackmun. In such a tragic event, President Reagan likely would have
sought to nominate an anti-Roe candidate.
4. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Sew., 492 U.S. 490, 517 (1989) (per Rehnquist,
C.J., joined by White and Kennedy, JJ.) ("[T]he doubt cast on the Missouri statute by
these cases is not so much a flaw in the statute as it is a reflection of the fact that [Roe's]
rigid trimester analysis" has proved to be unsound and unworkable in practice); Thorn.
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 814-15 (1986)
(O'Connor, J. dissenting) ("That the Court's unworkable scheme for constitutionalizing
the regulation of abortion has had this institutionally debilitating effect should not be
surprising, however, since the Court is not suited to the expansive role it has claimed for
itself in the series of cases that began with Roe v. Wade....").
5. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
6. Id. at 870.
7. Id. at 879.
8. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. For Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 420 n.1 (1983)("Since Roe was decided in January 1973, the Court repeatedly and consistently has ac-
cepted and applied the basic principle that a woman has a fundamental right to make the
highly personal choice whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.") (citations omitted).
9. Casey, 505 U.S. at 857.
10. Id. at 876. To its credit, the Casey plurality opinion eschews the approach of
Webster, 492 U.S. 490 (cited in note 4), which had remitted the Roe right to the even
more debased status of a mere "liberty interest," whose infringement triggers only the
highly deferential rational basis review. See id. at 520.
11. Casey, 505 U.S. at 857.
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in controlling their own bodies, lives, and health through restric-
tions that, in practice, demonstrably preclude abortion as a fea-
sible option for many women-in particular, those who are
young, poor, or live far from an abortion provider.
Ironically, the illusory nature of Casey's so-called "reaf-
firmation" of Roe's "central holding"-which had already been
devalued by pre-Casey rulings' 2-was immediately assailed not
only by pro-choice advocates, but also by that staunch opponent
of Roe, Chief Justice Rehnquist. While his opinion in Casey de-
plored the plurality's failure to overturn Roe explicitly and di-
rectly, it simultaneously derided the plurality's handiwork as
having, in effect, achieved that result covertly and indirectly.
While the plurality protested-perhaps, to quote the Bard, "too
much"-that what it had preserved was the "essential" or "cen-
tral" holding of Roe, the Chief Justice dismissed these remains as
Roe's "outer shell." 3 In his mocking terms: "Roe continues to
exist, but only in the way a storefront on a western movie set ex-
ists: a mere facade to give the illusion of reality."'4 In the same
vein, he caustically commented: "Roe v. Wade stands as a sort of
judicial Potemkin Village, which may be pointed out to pass-
ers-by as a monument to the importance of adhering to prece-
dent." 5
The hopes of Chief Justice Rehnquist and the fears of pro-
choice activists have indeed been substantially realized. The Ca-
sey plurality opinion facilitated various and devastating attacks
on reproductive freedom. In that sense, insofar as it was in-
tended to reinvigorate the real Roe right, the plurality opinion
has been a failure. But insofar as it was designed to convince the
public that Roe is safe and working, the plurality opinion has
been a success-with dismaying consequences for the reproduc-
tive freedom movement and for the actual rights of real women.
What has proven to be important has been the broad public
(mis)perception of the plurality's constitutional handiwork-the
idea that some common ground had been discovered, and that
the actual right vouchsafed in Roe really had survived, albeit
with some few and not overly burdensome qualifications.
12. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Webster, 492 U.S. 490; City of
Akron, 462 U.S. 416; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). In our view, the Casey Court
extended existing deviations from Roe's core principles.
13. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 944 (cited in note 2) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
14. Id. at 954 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
15. Id. at 966 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Casey thus fostered a "Roe was saved" public mindset.
Such mantra magic has buttressed the belief that the realities of
abortion do or will coincide with the bold declarations of the
plurality opinion. Yet, unfortunately, that has not occurred.
Casey's lip-service to Roe's "essential holding" must be
judged against the realities of reproductive freedom. Consider
the following examples (pre- and post-Casey) of real-world con-
straints on meaningful access to a range of reproductive services
and options, including abortion. As of this writing:
* Only twelve percent of all residency programs in obstetrics
and gynecology require routine training in first-trimester
abortions;
* Over eighty-five percent of all U.S. counties, which are home
to a full third of all women of childbearing age, have not a
single abortion provider;
" Almost one in four abortion clinics has faced severe
anti-abortion violence, making it ever m 6 re difficult for any
such clinics to obtain insurance and rental property;
* There are ninety-one counties where a Catholic hospital,
which provides no abortion services, is the sole health care
provider. Ninety-five percent of those hospitals are in coun-
ties with a minority Catholic population;
* Mergers between Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals are
rising sharply, with a total of 127 between 1990 and 1998. In
almost half of the cases studied during this period, all or
some of the reproductive health services that previously had
been provided by the non-Catholic hospital (including birth
control, emergency contraception (the "morning-after pill"),
sterilization, and abortion) were eliminated following the
merger;
" Over twenty-five percent of all states prohibit all or some
types of insurance coverage for abortion; four states prohibit
any such coverage, while ten prohibit such coverage for pub-
lic employees using public funds;
" Thirty-two states do not fund abortions for women receiving
Medicaid (although they do fund pregnancy and perinatal
services for those women) unless a pregnancy endangers the
woman's life or is the result of rape or incest;
* At least fourteen states require a delay following
state-directed "counseling"-which is skewed to discourage
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abortion, often through misleading propaganda-before a
woman may obtain an abortion. Eight additional states re-
quire such "counseling" (without a mandatory delay) before
a woman may obtain an abortion;
" At least twenty-nine states require parental consent (fifteen
states) or notification (fourteen states) before a minor may
obtain an abortion;
* At least eleven states enforce bans against so-called "par-
tial-birth" abortions (eight apply at all stages, three apply
post-viability only). Despite the distorted, inflammatory la-
bel and rhetoric, most of these laws are so broadly and
vaguely written that they threaten all abortion procedures
throughout pregnancy;
" Several states are attempting to impose cumbersome, expen-
sive, and unwarranted requirements on abortion clinics, un-
der the guise of health and safety regulations; 16 and
* The House of the 106th Congress passed a bill granting legal
status to a fetus by establishing criminal penalties for anyone
who injures or harms a fetus.17
The aforementioned facts highlight the attenuated status of
reproductive freedom in America, a reality at odds with the
spirit, as well as the letter, of Roe. However well-intended, the
Casey joint opinion provided at least political encouragement,
and at worst judicial sanction, for such real-world threats and re-
strictions on reproductive freedom. What is becoming increas-
ingly apparent, however valuable the judicial check on legisla-
tion, is that meaningful access to abortion continues to be
eroded while the "essential holding of Roe" continues to be reaf-
firmed."
To return to the call of the question: What if Planned Par-
enthood v. Casey had been decided differently? What if Roe had
been reversed outright and completely, rather than, as Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist charged, indirectly and evasively? Here are a few
of our guesses:
16. All of the data come from The Alan Guttmacher Institute (Wash., D.C.) except
for the data on clinic violence (Feminist Majority Foundation, Arlington, VA.), on
ob/gyn residency programs (Medical Students for Choice, Wash.,D.C.), and on Catholic
hospitals and their mergers with other hospitals (Catholics for Free Choice, Wash., D.C.).
17. See Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 1999, H.R. 2436,106th Cong. (1999).
18. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
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" Criminal bans on abortion-such as the ones in Louisiana,
Utah, and Guam-might well have been upheld, with more
states following suit, putting women's health in serious jeop-
ardy;
* There would have been considerable pressure on the then-
Democratically-controlled Congress to pass the Freedom of
Choice Act (FOCA), which was intended to codify Roe's
principles as a matter of -federal statutory law. President
Bush, however, probably would have vetoed such legislation
with a slim likelihood of his veto being overridden;
* Bill Clinton's margin of victory in 1992 might well have been
greater if Roe had been reversed and FOCA vetoed;
* In 1993, a Democratically controlled Congress and a Clinton
Administration with a pro-choice mandate would have had a
clear political imperative to pass FOCA, and they might well
have succeeded; and
" The outcomes of the 1994 congressional races might have
been notably different if pro-choice voters perceived that it
was essential to keep pro-choice lawmakers in office. Then
again, the passage of FOCA might have led, in time, to an
anti-abortion backlash.
If nothing else, such speculation suggests a reasonable as-
sumption-namely, that had Roe been reversed outright, the
politics of abortion would have reflected a significant mobiliza-
tion of pro-choice forces, a development that Casey deterred.
The formal reversal of Roe, in other words, might well have
strengthened the reproductive rights movement in much the
same way that Roe itself galvanized the anti-abortion movement.
If so, this suggests a possible repeat phenomenon, a cyclic back-
and-forth campaign between the respective forces. Under our
scenario, accordingly, the passage of FOCA in turn might have
stimulated a re-energization of the anti-abortion movement,
perhaps leading to a Congressional repeal of FOCA, or at least
to a scaling-back of its protections. When the political dust fi-
nally settled, the national legislative result could well have mir-
rored the status quo post-Casey.
We can speculate until the proverbial cows come home as to
which "result" would prove most rights-protective in the long
run. That there can be some degree of doubt on this point-and
we stress that there can be-calls to mind a more important les-
son. It is this: Civil libertarians proceed at their peril if they as-
sume that the protection of rights is exclusively or even primarily
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the responsibility of the judiciary. Living as we do in what re-
mains of the legacy of the Warren Court, too many civil liber-
tarians have become too accustomed to leaving too much to the
courts and too little to the legislatures when it comes to safe-
guarding rights. This is not-and we emphasize this point-
some Borkean call for judicial abdication. Rather, it is a call for
a more proactive rights-protective legislative agenda to comple-
ment the gains made by judicial review. It is a lesson in progres-
sive reform-a lesson long ago put into practice by Louis Bran-
deis with significant support from Josephine Goldmark and
Florence Kelly.19 Sadly, however, it is a lesson that too many
civil libertarians have unlearned.
To some extent, judicial declarations have blinded some
civil libertarians to the realities of life; to the realities of every-
thing from abortion rights post-Roe to custodial rights post-
Miranda?' Life is not always what the law, or a plurality of Jus-
tices, says it is. Roe is being deconstructed year-in and year-out,
law after law, decision after decision, regulation after regulation,
and all of this buttressed by the ongoing hostilities toward re-
productive service providers. Meanwhile, Casey assures us that
all is "essentially" well, that Roe is "essentially" safe. While
Roe's reversal would have gravely endangered women's rights
and bodies, such a declaration of war would have been seen for
what it was and would not have invited the false security fos-
tered by Casey.
The essential problem with Casey-i.e., creating illusory
perceptions that camouflage reality-is that it encourages the
supporters of reproductive rights to fiddle while their Rome
burns. But, given today's realities, they cannot afford to be
Neronian. If they are, they may only be "excused by two facts:
[they do] not know that [they] fiddle[ ], and [they do] not know
that Rome burns."'2
19. These two women were an essential part of the Brandeis campaign for progres-
sive legislative reform (and also played a major role in writing the famous "Brandeis
brier'). See Ronald K.L. Collins and Jennifer Friesen, Looking Back on Muller v. Ore-
gon: Part 1, 69 A.B.A. J. 294 (1983); Jennifer Friesen and Ronald K.L. Collins, Looking
Back on Muller v. Oregon: Part 11, 69 A.B.A. J. 472 (1983).
20. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
21. Leo Strauss, Liberalism Ancient and Modern 223 (Basic Books, 1968).
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